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Ranciere on the politics of 
exclusion 
Jf6 Claude Mangion. 
Jacques Ranciere's writings on 
political philosophy are generating 
increasing interest for their novel and 
radical way of re-thinking politics within 
the framework of equality. Although I am 
not sure he would accept the label, his 
writings have attracted the interest of 
anarchist philosophers for they provide a 
critique of the existing social order with 
its inbuilt structural inequalities together 
with a theory of democratic participation 
that runs counter to our commonplace 
assumptions of democratic practice. 
Apart from his political writings, it 
must be said that Ranciere has contributed 
to several other intellectual areas: he has 
written on aesthetic's, cinema, and 
literature in his later texts, as well as 
conducted archival work and theoretical 
analyses in his earlier ones. The depth and 
range of his writings have made it difficult 
to classify him within any clear-cut category 
of studies, but in each of these areas the 
challenge to our customary way of think 
retains its critical edge. 
In this paper, I would like to show 
that the functioning ofa political system 
necessitates perpetuating a logic of 
inclusions and exclusions. In a number of 
his texts, Ranciere critically exposes the 
underlying logic of exclusion at work in 
certain political systems and at the same 
time presenting an alternative vision. 
Situating Ranciere 
A key to understanding Ranciere's 
political philosophy is his critical 
relationship to Althusser whose seminars 
he had attended as a student. A central 
tenet of Althusser's political philosophy as 
formulated in Reading Capital (2009) is the 
distinction between science and ideology. 
This distinction can 
be roughly described 
as having two characteristics: (a) it is the 
expression of the beliefs, values and 
attitudes of a particular society; (b) it 
functions to maintain the power structures 
of a social order. On this account, both 
philosophy and politics belong to the 
sphere of ideology operating so as to hide 
the way society and political relations really 
exist. 
Althusser opposes ideology to his version 
of scientific Marxism which he articulates 
as the discipline that identifies the real 
power structures and dominant forces in 
a society. Scientific Marxism exposes the 
ideological expressions that mask the 
realities that unfold within a society. It 
was only his scientific Marxism that could 
adopt the mantel of being the agent for 
change by transforming ideological 
concepts into scientific ones, and thereby 
revealing the oppressive forms of 
domination maintaining a society. 
In Althusser's Lesson (2011) 
Ranciere's responds to this central 
distinction of Althusser. He argues that: (a) 
by privileging science, Althusser reinforces 
the privilege attributed to the Marxist 
theoretician insofar as it is the Marxist who 
knows how to identify the ideological 
expressions Circulating in society, whereas 
the 'ordinary' workers remains trapped 
within the imaginary ideological world. 
Ma rxism, on Althusser's account, posits 
itself as an epistemologically superior 
practice that only can lead everyone else. 
In effect, what this amounts to is that one 
stmctural inequality is replaced by another; 
(b) by constituting ideology as a totality, it 
ceases to be the 'site of struggle'. Since 
Althusser's formulation of ideology 
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subsumes within it all expressive forms, 
then ideology itself becomes a space 
without contrary forms of opposition; the 
result, as Ranciere points out, is that it 
normalizes society, making it seem that 
everything is as it should be, and therefore 
without any motivation for change. Society 
- as a space within which the reality of 
struggle unfolds - is neutralised into a 
seamless totality. 
The difference between Althusser 
and Ranciere can be viewed from within 
the broader perspective of the competing 
philosophical positions of the time. 
Althusser's Marxism was indebted to 
structural linguistics with its focus on the 
construction of signs and discourse, with 
ideology itself formulated as a discourse 
that the scientific Marxist needs to unmask. 
Ranciere opposed this concept of ideology 
localising it instead within material 
conditions of existence: it is 'a power 
organised in a collection of institutions' 
(Ranciere 2011, p. 142). This is why, for 
him, an ideological conflict can never be 
merely a conflict of signs unfolding at an 
abstract level, but rather,. an actual struggle 
located within the I)'laterial world. 
While Tanke (2011) has pointed out 
that Ranciere's early text on Althusser does 
not explicitly tackle the question of equality 
that will become central to his later political 
writings, the logic of inclusion and exclusion 
operating within a society is an explicit 
critique of Althusser insofar as the latter's 
valorisation of scientific Marxism operates 
through a system of exclUsions, ironically 
that of the workers. . 
Underlying Althu'sser's contention 
that scientific Marxism was necessary to 
lead the workers was the assumption that 
the workers cannot think for themselves, 
but need someone else to think for them.1 
In The Nights of Labour (1989) Ranciere 
undertakes archival research, where he 
finds evidence contrary to the widespread 
belief that workers identified themselves 
strictly and enthuSiastically in terms of the 
manual labour they performed and were 
therefore considered incapable of 
intellectual activities. This form of exclusion 
was common to western political 
philosophy even among theorists who 
spoke on behalf of the left. 
The origin of Ranciere's archival 
project began with the aim of researching 
historical documents for 'primitive 
revolutionary manifestoes' so as to discover 
what the workers themselves said of their 
situation, to discover the 'authentic' voice 
of the workers,2 rather than what others 
said for them. He wanted to hear their 
own voices, much like Foucault had worked 
with prisoners' groups so as to create their 
own voice. This is why Ranciere refused 
to categorize or correct their works since 
doing so would have positioned him as 
their representative, their voice. 
However, this initial project was 
abandoned as Ranciere discovered that no 
such manifestoes existed. What he did 
discover was that the workers, far from 
being interested in their class 
consciousness or in taking pride in their 
own work, copied the bourgeois by 
producing poems, stories, essays and 
publishing them. What is interesting is that 
the workers, despite their long days of 
manual labour, enjoyed expressing their 
creativity in literary forms. It was only by 
repressing this aspect of workers lives that 
subsequent histories could claim that the 
workers were proud of their identities as 
workers. The upshot of Ranciere's analysis 
is that the strict categorisation of workers 
- that excluded them from intellectual 
pursuits by defining them according to a 
certain concept of class - is undermined. 
And the celebration of artistic expression 
was not merely an escapist strategy but 
required a mastery of aesthetic forms 
previously reserved for the few, a mastery 
that they were not considered capable of. 
For Ranciere, this celebration of 
aesthetic forms had a more far reaching 
effect than just the 'right' to enjoying 
oneself aesthetically as it entailed a re-
configuration of the space-time continuum 
that was deemed appropriate for workers. 
Instead of doing as they were told and 
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remaining at home to sleep and prepare 
for the next day's work, workers met at 
night to produce and share their literary 
works. In a sense, Ranciere's analysis shows 
that pleasure is transformed into a 
revolutionary activity for it disrupted the 
logic that excluded workers from aesthetic 
creativity. In effect, pleasure becomes not 
merely an escape from the drudgery of 
ma nuall abour but a contestation of the 
way roles are distributed in society: 'A 
worker who had never learned how to 
write and yet tried to compose verses to 
suit the taste of his times was perhaps 
more of a danger to the prevailing 
ideological order than a worker who 
performed revolutionary songs.'(cited in 
Ranciere 2004a, p. xi) 
Plato's exclusions 
The politics of exclusion and 
inclusion is elaborated upon in The 
Philosopher and his Poor (2004a) which 
provides a further elaboration of the 
challenge to the strict identities that are 
attributed to workers, a position that 
seems to pervade the history of philosophy. 
Traditionally} philosophy considers itself 
as a strictly intellectual discipline positioned 
in opPOSition to manual work with workers 
incapable of theoretical thought. Ranciere 
discusses this notion of the excluded 
workers in a number of theorists, ranging 
from Plato to Marx, Sartre and extensively 
in Bourdieu. For the purposes of this article 
I am narrowing my discussion to his views 
on Plato. 
In the Republic Plato outlines his 
vision of the ideal state and the 
requirements for having an ordered and 
stable society. This founding text of western 
political philosophy segregates its citizens 
according to the capabilities, but these 
capabilities are grounded in the nature of 
the person. The operating prinCiple by 
which the ideal state can maximize itself 
is expressed in the following way: 
' ... productivity is increased, the quality of 
the products is improved, and the process 
is simplified when an individual sets aside 
his other pursuits, does:the one thing for 
which he is naturally suited, and does it at 
the opportune moment.' (Plato 1993, p.60) 
As the city develops from a few 
individuals into a more complex social 
dynamiC replete with material and artistic 
productions, Plato installs the philosophers 
as the ones who oversee this development 
making sure that 'they do not engage in 
any work which does not tend towards this 
goal.'(Plato 1993, p. 91). Interestingly it is 
philosophy that marks out these different 
domains, that attributes to itself the task 
of thinking, while positing its' Others, the 
artisans as capable only of manual work. 
Within the ideal state each class is 
deSignated its particular place in society. 
In effect, what this amounts to is an 
assignment of roles specific to one's class, 
each of which excluding the other(s). 
The question that interests Ranciere 
concerns the way such roles are justified; 
what are the means used by Plato to 
legitimise such a strict demarcation of 
roles? In order to explain the 'order ofthe 
city' Plato, (in)famously introduces the 
'noble lie' where social classes are likened 
to different metals - gold, silver and iron 
-with different values associated with them 
and are segregated accordingly. The 
incompatibility between the metals is 
meant to justify the segregation between 
the classes. 
The paradox at the heart of Plato's 
discussion is that if the philosopher is 
supposed to be the upholder of truth, then 
why does he need to recourse to a lie 
(whether noble or not) to convince others 
of their place in society. The paradox is 
more glaring because it is usually Plato's 
enemies - the sophists, poets, and painters 
- who engage in the dubious practice of 
lying, in the fabrication of appearances 
that might seem to be true but are not. 
What is the difference between their lies 
and the lie of the philosopher? 
Ranciere argues that Plato's strategy 
for highlighting the difference between 
the two kinds of lie: (a) the first difference 
focuses on the similarity of motivation of 
the workers and the sophists, poets and 
painters as opposed to the motivations of 
the philosopher. Just as the workers are 
paid for their endeavours so too are the 
sophists, poets and artists expect financial 
remuneration for their productions. 
Philosophy differs from its others because 
it is not motivated by financial reward, but 
for the love of truth; (b) the second 
difference is cognitive:. the question of 
why philosophy needs to lie is answered 
by situating philosophy as an 
epistemological superior mode of knowi~g. 
When philosophers utter the noble lie, 
they know what they are. doing- they know 
when and how to lie. Again, the capability 
of this knowledge is the result of Plato's 
view that a person shol,lld follow his/her 
nature, and it is the nature of philosophy 
to know the distinction between the true 
and the false. 
In the 'order of discourse' Ranciere 
identifies another argument that Plato 
deploys so as to exclude anything that 
might disrupt the order of the state. This 
argument refers to the passage in the 
Phaedrus, where Plato opposes and 
privileges - as Derrida had already shown 
- the spoken to the written word. What 
interests Ranciere in this passage is the 
role of writing as a 'usurper' ofthe order 
established within the city. Writing usurps 
because it does not remain tied to its place, 
but 'drifts' across various hands. This 
lengthy citation sums up the threat of 
writing as a mute discol1rse, which knows 
neither its audience nor their needs, can 
transmit anything anywhere. It does not 
know to whom it is speaking, to whom it 
should speak, who call and cannot be 
admitted to a sharing [partage] of the 
logos. The living logos ofthe philosophers, 
the science of truth and lying, is also a 
science of speech and ~ilence. It knows 
the right time for keeping quiet. Written 
discourse, on the other hand, is as 
incapable of keeping quiet as it is of 
speaking. Mute in the face of philosophers' 
question, it cannot restrain itself from 
speaking to the uninitiated. (Ranciere 
2004a, p.40) . 
The philosopher, as represented by 
the spoken word and its application 
through the dialectic, is no longer the figure 
of authority since the written text can be 
accessed b~ anyone. And, for Plato, this 
constitutes the threat to the ordered city 
since the written word enables disorder-
the confusion and destabilisation of roles 
- to undermine it. 
On Ranciere's account, we can 
understand why Plato banished the 
rhetoricians, sophists and writing from .the 
city because it is these that make pOSSible 
the contamination of the 'purity' of the 
roles within the city. By having access to 
written texts, not only is the segregation 
of the philosopher-rulers, soldiers and 
workers disrupted, but the workers can 
challenge the philosophers in a literal 
displacement of roles. 
In order to establish the purity of 
philosophy as an activity of thoug~t, its 
non-thinking Others are located In an 
inferior position within the social order 
whereby each fulfils his sole function. This 
is why Plato would have all those who a.re 
engaged in imitation expelled from the City 
since imitation - and in particular the kind 
of imitation performed on stage - means 
that a person can copy another. The idea 
is introduced that another type of social 
order might be possible, a social order 
where the established hierarchies are 
different. It is the task of Plato's philosophy 
to ensure that such a possibility will never 
be actualized; the formation of the social 
order is overseen by the ph ilosopher who 
ensures that the structured relations are 
distributed according to the nature of each. 
Disagreement and the partition of the 
sensible 
Ranciere's political thought offers a 
different perspective on what is 
customarily taken for as politics. In 
Disagreements (1998) he develops his 
views on politics utilising the concept of 
disagreement together with the concept 
of equality as the basis for his political 
philosophy. Disagreement is defined as 'to 
mean a determined kind of speech 
situation: one in which one of the 
interlocutors at once understands and does 
not understand what the other is saying'. 
(1998: xl The concept of disagreement ties 
in with the concept of equality and 
democratic practice because those who 
disagree with the hierarchical system are 
those who can speak, but who - whatever 
they say - are not worth listening to 
because they are irrelevant. Even though 
they can speak, they have no place, no 
voice within the social order. As May writes, 
... disagreement concerns who gets to 
speak, whose voice counts. And more 
deeply, it concerns who actually has a 
voice, who is capable of speech. Workers' 
demands, women's demands, the 
demands of those whoare marginalized 
by race, class, immigration status and so 
on are not recognised as demands because 
they are not recognised as issuing from 
people capable of making real demands. 
(2010, p. 74) 
As a point of departure, Randere 
argues that we live within a given social 
world that is already partitioned with roles 
distributed such that'some members 
within it maintain positions of domination. 
There is clearly a hierarchy at work that 
constitutes an unequal social order. This 
might seem like a fairly obvious observation 
of society, but the interesting feature is 
that inequality necessarily requires as a 
minimum, a degree of equality. It is a 
structural necessity. What Ranciere means 
by this is that persons in society 
presuppose or assume that they are equal 
to others. It is when this presupposition 
of equality is denied to them that they 
realise that there are being treated 
unequally. This is why it is crucial for 
Ranciere to highlight equality as a structural 
feature or an inherent part of a society. By 
so doing, inequalities are exposed thus 
making it possible to challenge or resist 
them. Since there is nothing natural about 
these inequalities, since they are purely 
contingent features of society, then there 
is nothing to prevent such hierarchies from 
being changed. 
Ranciere's thinking on equality is 
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crucially tied to his views on the political 
in a broadly construed sense. It is fairly 
obvious that in the contemporary world 
there is a widespread disillusionment with 
political issues. This sense of disillusion has 
arisen because of the predominance of 
economics in political thought with politiCS 
transformed into a tool for managing the 
economy, as opposed to an activity that 
seeks to eliminate injustices from the 
world. 
Ranciere opposes this widespread 
view of politics-as-economics arguing 
instead, for a politics-as-disagreement. A 
useful entry point into Ranciere's thinking 
about disagreement is by recalling the 
Aristotelian view of politics as an activity 
that is exclusive of humans insofar as 
humans are animals with a 'logos' i.e., 
reasoned speech that can discriminate 
between 'what is just and what is unjust', 
whereas animals are only capable of 
producing sounds 'that express pain or 
pleasure' (Aristotle 1932, p.ll). The 
interesting point is that slaves had a 
language to the extent that they could 
understand the commands given to them, 
but their own utterances were closer to 
animal sounds. In effect, slaves did not 
have a voice because they were not 
recognised as beings that could have a 
voice. Ranciere takes politics to a more 
fundamental level by challenging the very 
space of what constitutes logos and phone. 
While for Aristotle, language is the 
necessary prerequisite for reasoned 
politica I speech, for RancU,re, politics 
entails whether one has the possibility of 
speaking or of being counted as relevant. 
What makes his views radical is the 
way he conceptualises the notion of 
disagreement since it 'is not to do with 
words alone [but] bears on the very 
situation in which speaking parties find 
themselves.' (Ranciere 1998, p. xi) Clearly 
he is not advocating the differences of 
opinion model that is basic to liberal-
democratic models. Instead Ranciere 
connects the concept of disagreement with 
the equality-inequality opposition that 
underlies his analysis of society. It is the 
very positioning of roles within a society 
that - together with the materia I resources 
that come with such a role - generates 
disagreement. The politics of disagreement 
is a conflict between those who have a 
voice Le., those who have a right to speak, 
and those who are voice-less. May 
expresses this point excellently, 'A 
disagreement, then, does not centre 
primarily on any set of demands that are 
made, but rather on who gets to speak 
and make demands' (2010: 74) 
As can be surm'ised, Ranciere's 
concept of politics is wiry different from 
the party politics that features in 
contempora ry democratic politics. He 
contends that what is currently considered 
as politics is not really politics at all insofar 
as the rival political parti'es all have a voice 
and have access to material resources, but 
differ with respect to some issue. 
Ranciere's analysis of politics goes much 
further in that it highlights those who are 
excluded despite their inclusion in the same 
social order. 
The question Ranciere must answer 
is: Given these inequalities, how is such a 
social system maintained? By way of 
answer, he introduces the concept of the 
police but by this he is liot thinking of the 
police either as an institution that functions 
to enforce the law or of a 'police state' 
where the actions of members of a social 
order are monitored. Rather, his concept 
of the police and of policing is broader in 
that it describes the way a social order is 
organised into categories and roles. The 
maintenance and reproduction of this 
social order is the task of policing. 
The police is thus first an order of 
bodies that defines the allocation of ways 
of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, 
and see that those bodies are assigned by 
name to a particular place and task; it is 
an order of the visible and of the sayable 
that sees that that particular activity is 
visible and another is not, that this speech 
is understood as discourse and another as 
noise.' (Ranciere 1998, p. 29) 
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Ranciere focuses on those who are 
excluded, on the voice-less i.e., teh 
irrelevant, by showing that the entire social 
system in its functioning is maintained by 
the police order that ensure that the 
reproduction of the system as 'more of the 
same'. Maintaining the stability of those 
who are included, of those already with a 
voice is what constitutes contemporary 
polities despite the appearance of conflict. 
This is not Ranciere's view: genuine politics 
is the conflict between those who have no 
choice, no place within the distribution of 
roles, and those who do. As Chambers 
eloquently puts it, politics 'only occurs, 
when the logic of domination intrinsic to 
any police order (since all police order are 
hierarchical orders) finds itself confronted 
with a different logiC, the logic of equality.' 
(2011, p. 201) 
The 'wronged' are those who are 
excluded and who, as a consequence, try 
to redress their situation. A wrong occurs 
when the presupposition of equality is 
negated, when the assumption that we 
are equal in a situation is revealed by the 
police order to be unequal. Political 
participation takes place when the 
hierarchies that are maintained by the 
police order are challenged, not merely 
verbally, but in the very unfolding or 
manifestation of the situation. The 
excluded are thereby suffering an injustice 
produced by the hierarchies within the 
social order itself and it is these inequalities 
that politics should strive to overcome. 
Given his theorisation of what 
constitutes political activity, Ranciere 
develops an account of democracy that 
can accommodate such political activity. 
As we can imagine, the conventional view 
of democracy as involving constitutions, 
elections and political parties that 
represent certain position is not his 
understanding of democracy. Rather, 
democracy is defined as 'the name of a 
singular disruption of this order of 
distribution of bodies as a community that 
we proposed to conceptualize in the 
broader concept of the police.' (Ranciere 
1998, p.99) Ranciere's account of 
democracy involves challenging the 
politicised social field as an always already 
ordered whole. It is by disrupting the 
normal fUnctioning of the social system 
that democracy comes into motion. When 
an inequality is recognised and those 
suffering from this inequality are 
transformed into a group, a process of 
subjectification has taken place. 
By subjectification I mean the 
production through a series of actions of 
a body and a capacity for enunciation not 
previously identifiable within a given field 
of experience, whose identification is thus 
part of the reconfiguration of the field of 
experience (Ranciere 1998, p. 35) 
The interesting feature of Ranciere's 
concept of su bjectification is that it 
transforms 'solitary' individuals into a 
political group, or move~ent.lt is a process 
of group identity formation, such that a 
sense of unity is established through the 
sharing of a common cause that strives to 
overcome a wrong.4 Democratic activity 
involves the production and identification 
of subjects who were previously unknown, 
both without an identity and voice-less. 
As a result of the disruption of the social 
order, the excluded, through a process of 
subjectification, become a force that can 
challenge the social order. 
The crucial feature underlying 
Ranciere's account of democratic 
participation is that of ~he voice: by this, 
he means 'a capacity for communication'. 
It is by virtue of having the capacity to 
speak or to communicate more generally, 
that the excluded can challenge the existing 
order. Aside from the dbvious emphasis 
on the voice that Derrida has alerted us to 
in the metaphysics of presence that 
characterises European thought, James 
(2012, p. 126) points out that by 
centralising speech in his revolutionary 
account of polities, Ranciere has opened 
himself up to the charges that (i) his own 
position excludes a number of humans 
that might be suffering an injustice - the 
disabled, the very young, brain-injury 
victims, and other degenerate illnesses. 
These are not capable of speaking for 
themselves and are destined to remain 
voice-less; (ii) animals are excluded 
completely so that animal rights activists 
find no value in his writings. 
In the Politics of Aesthetics (2004b), 
subtitled 'the distribution ofthe sensible' 
Ranciere continues to elaborate upon his 
notions of equality and inequality by 
reframing his discussion at the level ofthe 
senses and the relation between 
perception and meaning. In this way, he 
can show that his earlier arguments on the 
social order are grounded and structured 
at an even more fundamental level. The 
word 'distribution' in the subtitle is 
frequently also translated as 'partition' and 
Panagia describes it as a 'term that refers 
at once to the conditions for sharing that 
establish the contours of a collectivity (i.e., 
"partager" as sharing) and to the sources 
of disruption or dissensus of that same 
order (i.e., "partager" as separating)'. 
(2010, p. 95) 
The introduction of this key term in 
Ranciere's writings indicates that at the 
level of the sensory experience, the world 
that we perceive is both divided into 
categories and yet, despite this division 
forms the basis of a shared common world: 
'A distribution of the sensible therefore 
establishes at one and the same time 
something common that is shared, and 
exclusive parts.' (Ranciere 2004b, p. 12) 
The nature of the inclusions and exclusions 
that occur differ: the former is broader in 
that it includes within it a common world, 
a I ifeworld, while the latter is more specific 
and is the product of the various roles 
within a common world. As a result of 
one's position within this common world, 
one's perception and degree of 
participation is affected; the exclusions 
that result from one's situation within the 
world determine a certain perception of 
the world. It is evident that even at the 
perceptual level, a logic of inclusion and 
exclusion is in operation: the shared world 
is perceived as a series of inclusions that 
in turn generates its own exclusions. One 
might say that although these excluded 
bodies can be counted since they inhabit 
the same social space as others and 
therefore can be seen and heard within 
the sensible world, they are no-bodies, 
non-visible and voice-less within this shared 
social space. 
The partitioning of the sensible is 
also a task performed by the police. The 
work of the police ensures that the 
portioning of the world is complete such 
that there are no gaps or additions to it. 
In effect, the police function to retain the 
distribution of roles within a society. 
Interestingly, politics occurs when two parts 
of the sensible - the dominated and those 
who dominate - are in conflict, when those 
included voices are challenged by the voice-
less excluded. 
Conclusion 
Perhaps the upsurge of interest in 
the writings of Ranciere is a testimony to 
the dissatisfaction with the way we have 
taken the organisation of our political lives 
for granted. Perhaps, iUs being realised 
that the changes that have been 
implemented have been merely cosmetic 
and what is in need of change is more 
fundamental affecting both our perceptual 
and conceptual ways of organising the 
world. To this dissatisfaction, Ranciere 
offers a response that entails a wholesale 
rethinking of our political condition, a 
rethinking that involves a literal shifting of 
our customary way of.thinking politics 
away from certain established categories. 
In this paper, I have shown that one 
of Ranciere's fundamental political 
concerns involves an analysis of those 
processes by which the ordering of social 
life simultaneously includes everyone while 
excluding some. To do this, I have traced 
the way Ranciere elaborates on the 
formation of the social as an inherent 
system of inclusions maintained by a 
process of policing. It is evident from the 
texts examined that the issue of excluding 
those who are face-less and voice-less is 
one that Ranciere urges us to recognise 
and in so doing, he issues a call to political 
activity that goes further than the 
contemporary sedimentation of 
democratic politics as an unacknowledged 
collusion between political parties. Bibliography __________ _ 
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1. Panagia (20lD, p. 98) writes that Ranciere's break occurred 
because 'Althusser's theory of ideology creates and 5ustClins 
a fundamental inequality by insisting that revolutionary 
movements cannot proceed without revolutionary theory. 
That is, Althusser's ideal of emancipation cannot work without 
a prior commitment to the authoritative knowledge of theory' 
2. Ranciere writes of this period that he wanted 'to establish 
what working-class tradition was, and to study how Marxism 
interpreted and distorted itl. For many years I took no more 
interest in philosophy. More specifically, I turned my back 
on what might be called political theories, and read nothing 
but archive material. I posited the existence of a specifically 
working-class discourse.' (cited in 2004a, p. x) 
3. When the prisoners begin to speak, Foucualt writes that 
Ithey possessed an individual theory of prisons, the penal 
system, and justice'. (cited in Ranciere, 2011, p. 119) 
4. Rancierels notion of political action as the formation of a 
Iwe' is opposed to his notion of aesthetics that describes the 
formation of an II'. 
".r.r~ I '.0 
